Air Defence in Northern Europe

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE EXPECTATIONS

Russia

The peace-time air force and air defence organizations in the north-western area of Russia are as follows:³¹

76 Air Army

Headquarters, St. Petersburg

239 Fighter Division, Viitana

- 159 Fighter Regiment, Viitana

- 28 Fighter Regiment, Andreapol

149 Bomber Division, Gdov

- 722 Bomber Regiment, Gdov

- 67 Bomber Regiment, Siverski

98 Reconnaissance Regiment, Monchegorsk

277 Helicopter Squadron, Taibola

138 Support Regiment, Levashovo

The aircraft types include Su-27, MiG-29, Su-24, MiG-25, Su-17, Mi-8, Mi-6, An-12, An-26 and An30, and amount in total to about 90 fighters, 80 bombers and 60 reconnaissance aircraft, altogether about 230 aircraft and 35 helicopters.

6th Air Defence Army

Headquarters, St. Petersburg

Air Defence Corps, St. Petersburg

- 180 Fighter Regiment, Sakkola

- 177 Fighter Regiment, Lotinapelto

Air Defence Corps, Murmansk

- 174 Fighter Regiment, Monchegorsk

- 941 Fighter Regiment, Murmansk

- 470 Fighter Regiment, Afrikanda

Air Defence Corps, Arkangelsk

- 518 Fighter Regiment, Talagi

- 548 Fighter Regiment, Kotlas

The aircraft types include MiG-31, Su-27 and MiG-25, the total number of fighters being about 200.

Army Air Force of the Northern Military District

Headquarters, St. Petersburg

6th Army

- Attack Helicopter Regent, Alakurtti

- Transport Helicopter Regiment, Alakurtti

Helicopter Squadron, Taibola

Heavy Transport Helicopter Squadron, Römpötti

30 Army Corps

- Attack Helicopter Regiment, Kasimovo

The helicopter types include Mi-8, Mi-24 and Mi-6, a total of about 200 helicopters.

Northern Navy Air Force

Headquarters, Murmansk

Carrier Division, Kuznetsov

- Fighter Regiment

- Attack Regiment

- Helicopter Regiment

- Training Regiment, Murmansk

- Support Helicopter Squadron, Support Ships

Anti-Ship Attack Division, Olenia

- Anti-Ship Attack Regiment, Olenia

- Anti-Ship Attack Regiment, Arkangelsk

Attack Regiment, Olenia

Reconnaissance Squadron, Severomorsk

Transport Regiment, Pechenga

Maritime Surveillance and Anti-Submarine Division

- MSAS Regiment, Severomorsk

- MSAS Regiment, Kipelovo

- AS Helicopter Regiment, Murmansk NE

The aircraft types include Su-33, Su-25K, Su-27, Su-25, Tu-26, MiG-27, Su-24E, An-12, An-26, I1-38, Be-12, Tu-95D, Tu-142F, Ka-27 and Ka-25. The total number of aircraft is about 250 and that of helicopters about 50.

Baltic Navy Air Force

Headquarters, Kaliningrad

Transport Squadron, Krabrovo

Bomber Regiment, Chkalovsk

Bomber Regiment, Chernyakhovsk

Fighter Regiment, Nivenskoye

Maritime Surveillance and Anti-Submarine Regiment

The aircraft types include Su-24, Su-27, An-12, I1-38, Be12, Ka-25/27, Ka-32 and Mi-14, numbering about 130 aircraft and about 30 helicopters in all.

The Northern Military District can be supported by the Transport Division in Novgorod, with Il-76 transports, and by the Long-Range Air Force with its Tu-26, Tu-160, Tu-16 and Tu-95H planes. More support can be arranged from the 16th Air Army in the Moscow Military District and the Moscow Air Defence Army.

In the immediate wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Soviet Air Force relatively quickly reverted from a system with some 20,000 pilots and 13,000 aircraft to a new organization of 13,000 pilots and 5000 aircraft.35 Under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, Russia is authorized to maintain 3,450 fixed wing combat aircraft, 890 armed helicopters and 300 naval aircraft west of the Ural Mountains.^3l

The disintegration of the Soviet Union meant major changes in the country’s air defence. The transfer of enormous masses of equipment from the former Warsaw Pact countries and Baltic nations, combined with the scrapping of old material and relocation of newer material in the various depots, required a considerable logistic effort. These arrangements for the redeployment of troops and material were mainly carried out in 1994.

At this same time efforts have been going on to modernize and automate the air surveillance and control system. There is still much work to be done, but the program is aimed at creating a new computer-based display and data transfer system.

The air defence district is divided into sectors with their own air defence corps. These are responsible for air surveillance and intelligence, fighter defence and anti-aircraft defence in their respective areas.

The radio brigades are responsible for air surveillance and intelligence in each air defence sector. Each air defence corps has two or three brigades of this kind, and each brigade has from three to five radio battalions, each normally with two to four radar companies. The radar equipment is mostly modern, the majority of it having been introduced in the 1980s or 1990s. The most difficult part will probably be modernization of the signals network and the building up of a hand-operated digital transfer network of the necessary magnitude will take many years and a large amount of resources.

The AWACS Mainstay aircraft forms the mobile part of the air surveillance and control system, and is connected to the air defence corps network through its data transfer system. The Ilyushin A-50 Mainstay has undergone a continuous cycle of modifications and probably about 20 planes are currently in use. The production line may be discontinued, but no information on a possible successor has yet been released.

The composition of the Russian air forces is tending to follow the international trend for a decrease in both the total number of aircraft and the range of types. Almost all the older types such as the Su-15, Tu-126, MiG-27, MiG-23, Su-17, Tu-16 and Tu-22 were in the process of being phased out in the early 1990s, and the main categories of combat aircraft are now:

Fighters

Su-27, MiG-31 and MiG-29

Attack aircraft

Su-24D and Su-25

Bombers

Tu-26/Tu-22M, Tu-95 and Tu160

Reconnaissance aircraft

Su-24F/E and Tu-26

Only 23 new aircraft were purchased altogether in 1993 1994 and only one type of combat aircraft, the Su-27, was evidently in production in 1995. None were budgeted for 1996.46 Frontal Aviation has shrunk from a high of over 5000 combat aircraft in 1989 to less than half that number today. Of these, around a third are fourth-generation MiG29s and Su-27s. If current budget trends continue, Frontal Aviation’s holdings, by its own estimate, will decline from 2280 to 1440 combat aircraft in 2000. The Air Force leaders have stated that because of cash shortages, the first priority in fighter force enhancement would be Su-27 modifications, including the Su-35 air superiority fighter and Su-32/34 twoseat all-weather strike aircraft, as well as a reconnaissance variant and a much needed ECM/EW version.⁴⁶

The Air Defence Force has experienced a rate of decline much like that of the other combat air arms since the late 1980’s. From a high of some 2300 interceptors it is down to less than half that number today. Force modernization plans appear limited to developing and producing an advanced MiG-31, if and when procurement authorizations permit.46 The Air Force has done its best to sustain Mikoyan’s new I-42 or MiG-37 fighter program but has admitted that it would be "not soon" when it would come to fruition.⁴⁶

One problem for Russian strategic aviation has been the loss of about half of its bombers to the Ukraine, especially 15 Tu-160 bombers representing 65% of its fleet of that type. The negotiations between the two countries have resulted in the return of ten of these at a reasonably equitable price.⁴⁶ Development plans also exist for a new model, the Su T-60s middle-range supersonic bomber.

Strategic transport aviation has experienced similar problems to those affecting the bomber wing. About 30% of the I1-76 transport aircraft remained in the Ukraine, as well as the majority of the factories producing their parts. The oldest types, the An-12 and An-22, will reach the end of their service life in ten years, but if new types are not produced, the lack of air transportation will be one of the most serious factors limiting the application of Russia’s new military doctrine. The small number of tankers will also limit combined long-range operations, as the current tanker fleet is almost entirely occupied with strategic bomber operations. The Air Force leadership has stated that the present priority number one in military aviation is the air transport capacity.⁴⁶

A joint project exists with the Ukraine to build a transport aircraft, the An-70, to replace the An-12. This was planned to go into production early in 1990, but the program has been delayed. The only heavy transport airplane being produced in Russia at the moment is the An-124, to replace the old An-22s and some of the Il-76s. There are about 50 An-124s now in use.

The present tankers, of the Il-78 Midas model, are based on the Il-76 transport airframe. No information is available about the continuity of production, but there is an obvious need for more tankers. The Il-78 can refuel types such as the Tu-95, Tu160, Su-24, Su-27, MiG-31 and their variants.

The Mi-24 and its various versions represent the main attack helicopter currently in use in Russia, but there are two candidates to replace it, the Mi-48 and Ka-50. The service life of the Mi-24 will come to an end somewhere around 2005, so that production of its successor should begin fairly soon.

The basic weapon of the strategic bomber force is the AS-15 cruise missile, with a range of 2500 km. This can carry either a nuclear or a conventional warhead. An additional weapon is the AS-16 Kickback short-range attack missile, which is designed to eliminate the defence strongholds. A new cruise missile, the AS19, is in the initial development phase.

The main weaponry for the Tu-26M2 Backfire B bombers consists of aerodynamic AS-4/6 missiles, which have a range of 300-400 km. These are designed for use against both land and sea targets. The long-range Tu-26M3 Backfire C bombers can be equipped with AS-16 ASM missiles in addition to the AS-4/6 missiles. The conventional bomb load for the Tu-26 bombers is about 20 tons.

The main attack aircraft type, the Su-24, has a Kaira-24 laser and TV sighting system, and its maximum external load of 8100 kg can be made up of a wide variety of weapons e.g.:³¹

laser-guided bombs KAB-500L

conventional HE bombs FAB-100, FAB-250, FAB500

incendiary bombs ZAB-500Sh

retarded runway-cratering bombs BetAB

cluster dispensers RBK-180 or RBK-250 for PTAB-2 or PTAB 5 anti-armour bomblets

rocket pods S-8KO with 20 x 80 mm rockets or S-13 with 5 x 130 mm rockets

gun pods SPU-6 housing 23 mm GSh-23 twin-barrel cannon and 260 rounds of ammunition

air-to-surface missiles Kh-23M AS-7 Kerry, Kh-25, AS-10 Karen, Kh-29 AS-14 Kedge, Kh-31P AS-17 Krypton, Kh-58E AS-11 Kilter, Kh-59 AS-13 Kingpost

The main weapons for the interceptors are the semi-active radar missiles AA-9 and AA-10. A new active radar missile, AA-12, R77, was introduced in 1994. Two new active, obviously anti-AWACS, long-range radar missiles are being planned: the R-37, with a range of 150-300 km, and the KS-172, with a range of 400 km. These two may prove to be rivals, competing for the same, at the moment uncertain development resources. The main infrared missile is the R73, which can be used with a helmet sight.

The Mi-24 attack helicopter’s main weaponry consists of a portable gun, missiles and rockets. The use of rockets is decreasing and the use of missiles correspondingly increasing. The use of air-to-air missiles as a form of self-defence armament will be increased in the future.

The military air organizations of Russia inherited about 60% of the Soviet Union’s combat aircraft and 40% of its air bases,³³ and the basic organizational structure remained initially more or less the same, the obligation to carry out operations far away from the homeland tending to prevail among the various categories of mission. A three-step reorganization plan was then established to carry out:³³

an analysis of the status and resources of the air forces in 1992

reception of units from aboard and introduction of a new organization in 1995

balancing of the functions of the combat air support units in the new organization from 1995 onwards.

Respect for air power seems to be on the increase in Russia, especially after the results of the Gulf War. The then Chief of the General Staff Academy, now the Minister of Defence, Colonel General Igor Rodionov, said in a speech in spring 1992 that any future war will be fought with airborne weapons.³⁴ At the same time, however, resources are diminishing, and therefore some severe cuts in priorities among the mission categories are to be expected. Also, the inertia of the old Soviet system, which routinely favoured strategic missiles and armour, is still slow to die. Aviation equipment accounts for only 12-15% of Russia’s arms purchases, in contrast to an asserted 25-30% in the United States, whose major combined operations have been successes.³⁵ Actually, the proportion of the budget allotted to air resources is frequently used nowadays as a yardstick to measure the effectiveness of the defence systems of different countries. If the percentage of air resources is low, the defence forces will not be capable of modern warfare but will be oriented towards either internal security missions or guerrilla warfare. Or worse, they may be making Iraqi-type false investments in a capability for conventional warfare.

Throughout most of the cold war, the Soviet Air Force operated a specialized undergraduate pilot training program consisting of a dozen Higher Military Aviation Schools for Pilots.

The new system entails initial flight orientation in secondary boarding schools, followed by screening and selection for a five-year undergraduate pilot training program, with flight training solely on the L-39. Now cadets receive three years of classroom academic instruction. Only afterward it is determined whether they will continue on to the flying phase, which is now compressed into two years rather than spread out over three as before. Of the twelve original undergraduate pilot training schools, the Air Force now operates only four.⁴⁶

A certain decrease in the number of applicants has been noted due to changes in service conditions. The commandant of the former Kharkov Higher Military Aviation School for Pilots (WAUL), for example, noted that where 790 applicants were accepted in 1989, only 312 entered the program in 1990. It was common in the early 1970s for six to eight applicants to vie for each available pilot training slot nationwide, but today one finds a maximum of 1.5 applicants competing for each position. On the other hand, there is no shortage of pilots at the present moment relative to the number of aircraft, because the radical reduction in the latter means that certain units have as many as five pilots queuing for one aircraft.35 This, combined with the high price of fuel, has cut the annual number of flying hours per pilot down to an alarmingly low level.

The anti-aircraft defence system includes:

Space Defence Troops

Air Defence Anti-aircraft Troops

Army Anti-aircraft Troops

Naval Anti-aircraft Troops

Anti-aircraft fire is coordinated by the control center of each Air Defence Sector, and all anti-aircraft troops in the sector are subordinated to that organization. The basic organizational unit is the anti-aircraft missile brigade, which establishes a center to control the fire of its own units, the separate units in the area and the army anti-aircraft units. Both air defence and the army organizations have antiaircraft missile brigades, which are deployed so that only one brigade is responsible for each area and controls the fire of all the units in that area.

The air defence missile brigades have the Baikal-lE control system and the army missile brigades the Polyana-4E system, allowing them to communicate with neighbouring brigades, the air defence corps Universal-lE centers and Mainstay AWACS aircraft.

The main weapons of the air defence anti-aircraft missile brigades are the SA-5 long-range missile and the SA-10 multipurpose missile. There are several versions of the SA-5, which is a semi-active radar missile with a range of 200-300 km and a cruise speed of 3-4 mach. The system is basically moveable, but the majority of the arsenal is obviously deployed in fixed, fortified positions. A brigade normally has a group of 2-5 battalions belong to it, and target acquisition is normally carried out by the brigade control center radar. Every battalion has its own fire control radar.

The SA-10 is designed to intercept ballistic missiles (excluding intercontinental and middle-range missiles), aircraft and cruise missiles. One of the missile types is optimized for anti-missile functions. The range of the older missiles, designed for aerodynamic targets, is 100 km, while the newer types have a range of 150 km. The height coverage is 30 km and the top speed of the missile 6-7 mach. The anti-aircraft missile brigade has 1-3 SA-10 battalion groups, each normally of 3 battalions. Each battalion group has 2 target acquisition radars, a 3-D multipurpose radar and a CW radar optimized for low flying targets.

Each battalion has its own CW target acquisition radar and a pulsed doppler fire control radar equipped with an electronically phase-arrayed antenna. For anti-missile capability, a brigade must be equipped with a special target acquisition radar, also with an electronically phase-arrayed antenna. This is obviously not yet standard equipment in all brigades.

The older, massively deployed SA-2 and SA-3 systems are gradually being phased out, but they will probably remain on the inventory until after the turn of the century. The SA-2 and SA-3 battalions are deployed as separate units under direct control of the brigade control centers. They are evidently not connected to the brigades’ automatic Baikal-lE control systems.

The army anti-aircraft missile brigades are equipped with SA-4, SA-6/11, SA-12 or SA-10 missile systems. The SA-4 system is old and will probably be abandoned entirely fairly soon, while the SA-6/11 is a kind of hybrid system in which an attempt has been made to rectify certain fire control limitations and multi target functions in the SA-6 system by means of the combined use of SA-11 launchers. Both missiles have a range of about 30 km. The SA-12 Gladiator/Giant system S-300V was obviously intended originally to replace the army anti-aircraft missile brigades’ SA-4 and SA-6/11 systems, but it is possible that the SA-10, S-300PMU1, will become the main equipment for the army units as well.

The anti-aircraft missile regiments of the mechanized infantry divisions are equipped with either SA-8 or SA-6 missile systems. These will be replaced, probably in some ten years, with SA-15 or SA-18 missile systems, which are under development. Both are typical short-range systems. The anti-aircraft missile battalions of the mechanized infantry regiments are mainly equipped with SA-9 and SA-13 systems, and both will be replaced later with a new SA-19 system.

The Russian Air Force as a branch has been mainly an administrative organization, its combat units being subordinated to other branches. The Strategic Air Force, with its missile-equipped bombers, operates as a part of the Strategic Forces, while the main mission of the Frontal Air Force was to provide tactical air support for the army forces, and the air armies and tactical bombers of Long-Range Aviation were subordinated to the military districts. Only the Transport Air Force was operationally subordinate to the Air Force Commander at times of crisis. However, recently constituted Frontal Aviation Command (KFA) operates and maintains all tactical aircraft in the Air Force inventory. Its establishment withdrew Russian fighter aviation from immediate ownership of the regional military district commanders, long the practice throughout the Soviet era, and reassigned it to the Air Force.⁴⁶

The Air Defence Air Force is independent and directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, at least at present, but it is subordinate logistically to the Air Force.

The Naval Air Forces have common maintenance systems with the Air Force at various coastal bases, but operationally they are subordinate to the navies. The leadership of the Air Force has initiated an effort to simplify and concentrate the operational use of the country’s air assets, as the current system of forces, divided vertically into branches and horizontally into districts, is ill-prepared for dynamic, high-tempo air operations.

The traditional organizational resistance naturally prevails however, and the additional vision of several local conflicts having to be handled simultaneously may have had its own effect on the planning process.³⁶

The future prospects of Russian military aviation are not good in the short-term, due to the lack of resources. Many of the new projects will have to be postponed or even rejected and the modernization process will be slower than expected. Combined with the difficulties in recruiting and shortages in training hours, this will mean turbulent times for the leaders of the various aviation branches. The massive initial size of the force structure nevertheless offers opportunities for making sensible cuts within well established priorities and for extracting greater efficiency from the remaining capabilities by streamlining the overall command organization.

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