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AIR POWER BEFORE WORLD WAR II

Russian Empire/Soviet Unionl4

The first military aviation schools in Russia were established at Sevastopol, in the Crimea, and at Gatchina, near St. Petersburg, in 1910, and the branch continued to develop between then and August 1st, 1914, when Germany declared war on Russia, but too slowly to meet the demands of a major war. During the prewar period Russian military commanders preferred to purchase French aircraft such as Farmans and Nieuports, and they also acquired planes from Britain, Germany and the United States, but in smaller numbers. American Curtiss hydroplanes became popular in the naval air units after 1911, however. Domestic production was limited to foreign types, except for a few designs produced in St. Petersburg. Up to 1913, when Sikorsky demonstrated his four-engined transport plane, "The Grand", weighing 9,000 lbs, the aircraft consisted of single-engine biplanes and monoplanes, for most aviation specialists considered larger models impracticable. By the outbreak of war the Imperial Air Force had acquired two four-engined Sikorsky planes.

The Russian aviation industry grew from a few small factories in 1910 to a total of from ten to sixteen airframe and aircraft engine manufacturers during World War I, employing 10,000 workers and technicians. The foundations of the industry in Russia were laid by French firms and French capital, but most of the factories were hardly more than workshops. The largest comprised the French firm of Duks, founded in Moscow in 1910, the Russian-Baltic plant in St. Petersburg; and the Gnome Rhone engine plant, built by a French company in Moscow in 1912.

Following the outbreak of World War I, the Russian Government made greater efforts to expand and modernize military aviation. One Western European source of information maintains that a total of 1,769 airframes and 660 aircraft engines had been built by 1916, and another reports that Russia produced from 1,500 to 2,000 planes in 1917. One Soviet source has stated that the average output during World War I was from 230 to 380 planes a month, but reports from American observers in Russia at the time suggest a lower approximate figure, indicating that from 800 to 1,000 aircraft were built in 1917. In any case, total wartime production has been estimated at about 4,700 aircraft.

The disintegration of the combat capabilities of the Russian armed forces, including the Imperial Air Force, began during the early months of 1917. Following the March Revolution, which transferred power to Prince Lvov and later to Kerensky, air operations gradually came to a standstill.

Almost immediately after the overthrow of the Kerensky government, the Bolsheviks determined to establish a military air force to defend their victory in the October Revolution and, wherever possible, to extend its scope. Many of the political and military leaders of the new regime, including Lenin, were apparently impressed with the potential value of air power, not only as a military weapon to be used against both foreign and domestic enemies but also as a political and economic means of consolidating and expanding the Soviet system. Although the obstacles were formidable, circumstances provided later opportunities for political and military expansion, many of which the Soviet leaders exploited.

The first attempts to organize aviation units were made within the disintegrating structure of the Czarist Army and Navy and through local soviets, revolutionary committees and military bureaus. Petrograd and Moscow were the principal centers for the formation of the first Red Air Fleet elements from the beginning, however, and the centralizing authority emanating from Petrograd at first and later, after March 1918, from Moscow, asserted control over the local initiatives and prepared the way for the establishment of a Central Administration of Workers and Peasants Air Fleet.

The principle of collective leadership was retained until 1924. A Field Administration of the Air Fleet was established in September 1918 and attached to the Revolutionary Military Council, but the Air Fleet was not directly represented on the Council for several years. The Field Administration exercised operational command over all air units of the Red Army.

The total number of aircraft in units of the Red Air Fleet increased from about 140 in July 1918 to 350 by the end of 1920, when the Civil War ended in western Russia, although a great many planes were unserviceable by that time. By the time the Japanese left Vladivostok in October 1922 the number had risen to about 400 planes. From December 1920 to the end of 1922, Russian aircraft strength was replenished primarily by imports from Germany, Italy and Holland, and possibly also from Britain, as well as by the production of Russian models based on foreign types. The aircraft importation program begun at that time received priority attention during the succeeding NEP (New Economic Policy) period, and by the end of 1922 it was possible to assign several hundred planes that had survived World War I to training schools and units in the interior.

Aircraft imported during 1921 and 1922 included Italian Savoyas, Ansaldos and Balillas, Dutch Fokkers and German Junkers, and possibly some English De Havillands, Avros, Martinsydes and Vickers. About 100 Ansaldo single-seater and two-seater aircraft were delivered to Moscow by Italian pilots at the end of 1922. Fokker F-3 aircraft were used on the Moscow Königsberg route after 1921 by the newly formed Russian-German civil transport company called Deruluft. German-Soviet military collaboration increased in scope and concentration from 1919 and 1920 onwards, and had greater impact on the development of the Red Army, the Air Fleet and the aviation industry, particularly after the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. At that time, the German policy of collaboration with Russia, partly camouflaged as unofficial commercial relations and based on Bismarck's old policy of friendship for the East, was viewed by the German Reichswehr and elements of the Foreign Office as a military and political necessity in view of the onerous terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Both Germany and Russia had become outlaws in the community of nations. The Reichswehr established a "base" in Russia for the development of German military power, primarily artillery and aviation and chemical and mechanized warfare, and the military and economic strengthening of Russia as an ally of Germany was a concomitant of this eastward orientation. Red aviation benefited remarkably in organization, training and technology in this way.

During the decade that included the NEP and the first Five Year Plan (1929-33), the Soviet regime strengthened the foundations of the state and thus enabled fundamental improvements to be made in the size and operational capabilities of the military and civil air establishments. The needs of air power received the highest priority in the allocation of human and material resources. Assistance was procured from western Europe, especially Germany, whenever possible, however, and also from the United States. The more advanced "capitalistic" nations of the West were still superior in air power in 1932, but the Russians were gradually cutting back their advantage. At the same time, they skillfully used the potentialities of aviation to strengthen internal security, increase the prestige of Communism and support the long-term party program of international revolution.

The Red Air Force (former Red Air Fleet) also acquired greater power and influence in military councils under Red Army control. The principal organization directing it was still the Revolutionary Military Council, a collective body through which the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces controlled the Air Force of the Red Army and by which the Red Army General Staff and the military districts and separate armies, with their air force components, were ultimately governed.

Until about 1928, the Red Air Force field organization was subject to frequent experiments, which were usually carried out only in part before being superseded by others. The units first included a mixed variety of new detachments and squadrons, as well as some groups dating from the civil war period. Some were numbered and others bore names, e.g. the "Lenin Squadron".

The Red Air Force squadron became the principal tactical formation with a fixed establishment. There were two or three detachments, or flights, in each squadron, each of which contained two or three sections. Squadron strength varied considerably because of shortages and the variety of types available; the normal numbers were from eighteen to thirty-one. Some squadrons, independent flights of similar composition and groups were subordinate to the naval fleets.

The number of aircraft in Red Air Force units rose from more than 400 to about 1,080 between 1923 and 1928, over 800 having been purchased abroad. Although only 10% of the aircraft were less than three years old in 1923, about 600 could be considered reasonably new by 1928, at which stage the Soviet air force was about equal in strength to that of Great Britain.

Aircraft strength increased to about 1,300 in 1931, rose to 1,500 after Japan occupied Manchuria, and may well have reached 2,200 by the end of 1932, in anticipation of possible conflict. At that time bombers constituted over 30% of the total force, the remainder comprising mainly fighters, including two-seater planes, some attack fighters, numerous other aircraft to be used in direct support of ground forces, more modern seaplanes, amphibians, transports and trainers. A large bomber was introduced in 1931. Influenced by the doctrines of the Italian General Douhet, who advocated an independent bomber force for strategic air attack, the Red Air Force continued to rely substantially on such aircraft until the political purges of 1936 and 1937.

Aircraft of Soviet design entered production especially during the years 1930-1932. These comprised mostly the reconnaissance or multipurpose aircraft designated R-1, R-3 and R-6, which were used in tactical units, and the I-series singleseater biplane fighters, notably the I-2, I-3, I-4 and I-6.

By 1934 and 1935 the collegiate principle of command had been eliminated throughout the entire Soviet military organization, and both the Council of Labour and Defence and the Revolutionary Military Council had been abolished. Although the command and organization of the Red Air Force had improved in the 1930's, the Red Army continued to exercise effective control over air power, which was viewed chiefly as an instrument for supporting the ground forces. This meant that unit quantities were emphasized at the expense of the quality factors needed in air warfare.

The trend towards more conventional patterns of military organization lasted only until the political purges of spring 1937, however, which led to reintroduction of the commissar system and of organs of collective control, including military soviets at high command levels. More than 50% of the highest-ranking Air Force officers, including the commander-in-chief, were removed in the purges later that year.

Air defence, called PVO, received increasing attention during this period, particularly in the late 1930's. Additional PVO fighter squadrons were assigned to defend important cities and industrial centers, in conjunction with anti-aircraft artillery under the High Command, barrage balloons and supporting units. Warnings for the whole air defence system were provided by an organization called VNOS, which was divided into battalions and companies in 1937. The PVO fighter squadrons and anti-aircraft artillery battalions, under the command of either an air defence district chief or the commander of a military district, were attached to military district brigades for support and training. It was only in later years that a fighter interceptor command was formed in the Red Air Force.

During the Second Five Year Plan the number of aircraft rose from about 2,000 to more than 5,400, the figure reached in 1938, of which approximately 4,200 were considered first-line planes in 1937. Soviet fighters from 1937 on were primarily of the I-15 and I-16 types, designed by Polikarpov. The medium-sized bombers included the SB2, SB-2 Bis and DB-3.

The number of squadrons and brigades in the Red Air Force multiplied greatly from 1933 to 1939. The number of brigades rose from more than twenty-two to about fifty between 1933 and 1935, including over two hundred squadrons. Brigade strength in 1938 was approaching sixty, not including seven or eight brigades engaged in naval aviation. The following year the number of brigades theoretically available must have been about eighty.

When the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30th November 1939 it committed almost half of its total aircraft strength to the offensive. Since bombing operations played a great part in the air campaign plan, the proportion of the total available strength of Soviet bombers engaged over Finland was almost 50%. Each Red Army unit was supported by one or two air units of brigade size.

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