Russian Air Force 3.1

3. CURRENT STATE OF THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE

3.1. Doctrine

The Russian Security Council approved the new military doctrine in its meeting on November 2, 1993, and President Boris Yeltsin confirmed it the same day. The doctrine will be specified more closely also in the future.

The doctrine, a document containing 23 pages, provides the guidelines for Russian security planning and execution of the plans. At the moment, local and regional conflicts are considered the biggest threat to national security. In case of a major war, Russia will resort to using the most efficient offensive and defensive methods in order to bring the conflict to an end as quickly as possible.

In accordance with the most probable threat, Russia underscores mobility and units capable of rapid reaction. The intention is to deploy to the conflict area air forces equipped with weaponry that will end the state of war rapidly (16). In spite of the slowness caused by tradition, the doctrine does point out that "success in ground operations depends more and more on air force operations beginning from achievement of air supremacy and ending at enemy surrender" (19). Even though the threat of a major war is considered small as compared to local conflicts, the doctrine does remind of the constant need of high-tech equipment and weaponry (19).

The doctrine analysis of the Russian Air Force brings out four different scenarios to be used as foundation for defense planning (19):

1.

The northwestern and western sector, where NATO might use force to settle an internal Russian conflict, deny the legitimate needs of Russia, or take over certain areas of Russia due to reasons related to strategic or post-conflict negotiations. In this scenario, NATO would use its air and naval forces in order to take over the Kaliningrad area and to penetrate the military districts of Leningrad and Moscow through Belarus and Ukraine. After the air operations, the ground forces would advance to the areas in question. The scenario calls for interception of air strikes and landings by using offensive and defensive air operations.

2.

The southwestern strategic sector, where the possible threats include Turkey and Iran attempting to weaken Russia's positions at the Trans-Caucasian area and to win over large Muslim populations in Azerbaijan, North Caucasus and other conflict areas within the sector. According to the scenario estimate, escalation of combat in Armenia or Azerbaijan or complete collapse of Georgia might lead to an extensive military intervention of Russia, Turkey or Iran. This possibility, on the other hand, might lead to expansion of military operations for instance through Turkey's NATO membership. The scenario calls for rapid counter-measures from the North Caucasian air force units and support from the total air force resources.

3.

The Far Eastern strategic sector, where it is deemed possible that, if Russia significantly weakens its military presence on the South Kuril Islands, it might encourage Japan to settle the problem of its "northern regions" with force. This would be done with U.S. support, so capacity against American aircraft carriers is deemed necessary.

4.

East Siberian strategic sector, where the possible threat is a Russo-Chinese conflict. It would begin with Chinese regional demands concerning parts of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. Since the area in question is so large as compared to the ground force resources, and the logistical and other problems are great, immediate use of air force against China's important strategic military targets, command systems and industry is emphasized.

The analysis points out that the air force has to be capable of a number of different operations, which resemble each other in all the areas under scrutiny. On the other hand, it is also important to take into account the special conditions of each region in terms of climate, size, airbase network and logistics. In case Russia intends to fulfil the requirements of its new military doctrine, some serious improvements are considered necessary in the Russian Air Force's current unit structure, choice of aircraft and weapons, industrial support, groupings, airbase and logistical structure, command, control and intelligence systems, and flexibility of formations (19).

More recently, estimates of a possible new doctrine have started to emerge. It would be clearly more aggressive in nature than the previous one. It would contain references to, for instance, possible first use of nuclear weapons and the requirement to be capable of one fully-fledged regional war, one smaller conflict and three peacekeeping operations. In the air force special attention is paid to strategic units, frontline air forces and transport aviation forces, which can be used as mobile operative-tactical deterrence force. According to the proposed reforms the aircraft of the Russian Air Defense Force were to be attached to the Russian Air Force (15).

NATO`s expansion to the East with the estimations that it will be the leading military - political force in Europe has sharpened the Russian expressions. Quite ominous expressions were given about some international problems. For example the multinational effort to stop the killing in Kosovo was called as "the effort to start the war in Kosovo" (83). The effort to keep dictator Saddam Hussein short of mass destruction weapons was called as "illegitimate operation against Iraq" (102). Upd 10 Feb '99

Although the Defense Ministry pointed out that the March 1999 exercises were preplanned, it was estimated in the media that their character might be associated with the NATO expansion, aggravation of the situation in Chechnya and possible measures for destruction of terrorist training camps in the rebublic. Testing of aerial delivery of S-300 systems was also said to be probably conducted to prepare for the planned transportation of the systems to Armenia and Greek island Crete. On 15 March 1999 President Yeltsin approved "The main clauses of the Russian policy in the sphere of nuclear deterrence". It pointed out that Russia considers its nuclear forces as the quarantee of the national security and deterrence of a probable aggression against Russia and its allies. The document was published on the eve of official joining of new members (Poland, Czechia and Hungary) to NATO and was said to be kind of Russia`s response to the threats on the part of the alliance. The document does not say if Russia is to be the first to use nuclear weapons and if it will use them against the countries, which do not posses them. (123)Upd 27 March '99

One unfortunate example of the Russian attitude to the international cooperation was the detention of the Ruslan military transport plane in Baku on 18 March 1999. There were six MiG fighters and some other military hardware in its cargo bay. The fighters were accompanied by about 30 combat pilots and technicians. Official Azerbaijan considers them to be mercenaries. There was no confirmed knowledge about the destination of the transport, however, one explanation could be an effort to break the international embargo of weapons. (124) Upd 27 March '99

In April of 1999 Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev stated that "in connection with the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia Russia`s military doctrine will undergo changes. This time we will focus on a higher degree of readiness of the nuclear deterrent forces and the development of the national air defense force." The reason was given that the task of eliminating the enemy`s airspace strikes is coming increasingly to the forefront again. The expressions tell that during the late nineties somewhat neglected Gulf war experiences have come up again. (125) Upd 30 May '99

Kosovo has actually acted as a kind of second awekener for the Russian military. The first one was the Persian Gulf war which was then rather quickly forgotten by the traditionalists. Now the NATO air operations in Kosovo have again shown the decisiveness of the airpower. There have been in the media demands for the new Air Force which should be the main branch of the Armed Forces (129). Also in the NAVY organization the aviation should be the the main component (130). Upd 6 Nov '99

The new military doctrine of 2000 reflects the problems of the defense forces. The desire for the earlier superpower status is shown in the emphasis of the nuclear arsenal. In the more pragmatic military sector, the conventional forces, the Air Force is given the number one priority in the military reform of 1999 (141). 11 March 2000

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Russian Air Force, Chapter 3

3. CURRENT STATE OF THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE

3.1. Doctrine