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Key Lessons Learned

 

• MARITIME PRE-POSITIONING

... allowed for one heavy Marine Brigade to be deployed within ten days of decision making.

... not enough engineering equipment & supplies to build defensive fortifications and to engineer

against fortified areas was included

... F-18/AV-8B/A-6E/EA-6B and helicopter "depot level" repair ships proved extremely worthwhile to the point where infantry/armour vehicle repair ships might

be created for future operations.

... US Army considering the idea, but primarily for bulk ammo & consumables

• ON HAND SEALIFT/AIRLIFT PROVED INADEQUATE

... 25 knot roll-on/roll-off ships proved very effective

... the Pentagon has sent out requests to all owners of roll-on/roll-off

ships to sell their resources to the USG

... continually built the case for better integration with civilian carriers and how

important the C-17 and C-5B are.

• COMBAT ENGINEERS

... US Army stripped engineers from all world wide units

... major re-think needed on engineering resources

• LIGHT AIR DEPLOYABLE ARMOURED CANNON (TANK)

... 82nd & 101st Divisions and the USMC need a light tank tht can go in the advanced stages of

an operation with them, similiar to the mission of the Sheridan, but more advanced with

night AT systems

• PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS

• EVERY VEHICLE WITH IFF

• EVERY AIRCRAFT WITH DATA LINK

• Need improved technology to fuse intelligence data from military spacecraft

with ground based data pertinent to battlefield situations and requirements.

• More imaging reconnaissance satellite data to commanders needs to be

accelerated

• Better use of SATCOM links for maintenance and repair data

• Not enough M88 Tank Recovery Vehicles, M1's were used

• JSTARS did for the Ground Commander what AWACS did for the Air

• AV-8B's were extremely vulnerable to ground fired IR SAM's, all five

Aircraft hit went down while four F/A-18's recovered at the bases

• After great debate, the ALQ-184 Jammer Pod was deemed very capable and

responsible for the low loss rate.

• BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

v pilot reports were not reliable, onboard FLIR & gunsight tapes

v overhead imagery does not provide complete data

v realtime assessments deemed not possible

 

MISTAKES MADE BY SADDAM HUSSEIN

1. Misjudgements

2. Loved to scheme, not able to innovate

2. Ordered or allowed his Air Force to flee

3. Denied frontline troops fital food and water

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Revised: tammikuu 02, 2006.