Gulf War Chronology

Gulf War Chronology (select date to view operations)
1989-90 Operations, Part 1	1989-90 Operations, Part 2	1 - 16 Jan 1991

War Day	Date	War Day	Date	War Day	Date	War Day	Date
Day 1	17 Jan '91	Day 12	28 Jan '91	Day 23	8 Feb '91	Day 34	19 Feb '91
Day 2	18 Jan '91	Day 13	29 Jan '91	Day 24	9 Feb '91	Day 35	20 Feb '91
Day 3	19 Jan '91	Day 14	30 Jan '91	Day 25	10 Feb '91	Day 36	21 Feb '91
Day 4	20 Jan '91	Day 15	31 Jan '91	Day 26	11 Feb '91	Day 37	22 Feb '91
Day 5	21 Jan '91	Day 16	1 Feb '91	Day 27	12 Feb '91	Day 38	23 Feb '91
Day 6	22 Jan '91	Day 17	2 Feb '91	Day 28	13 Feb '91	Day 39	24 Feb '91
Day 7	23 Jan '91	Day 18	3 Feb '91	Day 29	14 Feb '91	Day 40	25 Feb '91
Day 8	24 Jan '91	Day 19	4 Feb '91	Day 30	15 Feb '91	Day 41	26 Feb '91
Day 9	25 Jan '91	Day 20	5 Feb '91	Day 31	16 Feb '91	Day 42	27 Feb '91
Day 10	26 Jan '91	Day 21	6 Feb '91	Day 32	17 Feb '91	Day 43	28 Feb '91
Day 11	27 Jan '91	Day 22	7 Feb '91	Day 33	18 Feb '91		Day 44-75

1991 Operations	1992 Operations
1993 Operations	Air War Debriefs
Scud Missile Summary	Cruise Missile Summary
First AMRAAM Score 27 Dec 1992	Air Combat Box Score
Fixed-Wing Aircraft Combat Attrition	Iraqi Inventory and Losses
Statistics on the Participants	Key Lessons Learned
Good Reading Material on the Gulf War	The "No-shit" Magazine Reading List

Gulf War Chronology by Easy Tartar

By Easy Tartar

Easy Tartar along the Laotian border

GENERAL OVERVIEW:

Never in the history of Airpower has such a successful air operation been conducted. The war was characterized by "full span night operations", "high sortie rates", and "robust yet flexible" applications of composite air "packages" and special high-tech resources. There was a great lesson learned from the fact that numerous air organizations could integrate all of their air components under a single "Air Boss". The so called Air Tasking Order (ATO) directed the assembly, configurations, manning, launching, servicing, targeting, and recovery of over 2200 coalition aircraft across a span that would have included Naples (Italy) to Bodo (Norway), if we looked at it in a NATO context. To some extent it was a miracle because it worked within the framework of an eight-hour cycle, or three major periods (cycles or waves) per day with room for "audibles". The mechanics and the execution of this Air Planning and Execution tool will be looked at for a long time. Had there been a stubborn and tenacious enemy we might not have been so "glorious", yet odds have it we still would have been "victorious".

The individual pilots, squadrons, and composite wings that undertook the missions each had a unique, interesting and sometimes heroic story to tell. With the victory though, also came some serious second thoughts on actions taken and not taken. From this experience, we must hope that we have in part matured the next generation of combat warriors. All of the generals lauded the performance of their troops, their morale, and their dedication to winning. It seems incredible that anything less was ever considered, but again, as time distanced the reality of the war, old political wounds opened up rivalries that again slanted the growing pile of "Lessons Learned" reports. In all past wars, the main enemy to the soldier, particularly the aviator, was generally the incompetence of their own battle staffs. In this war we might have spared the average soldier that fate, although the final decision to end hostilities may have been more to give President Bush a clean sheet in casualties then to end at some decisive win point.

For the Second Gulf War, we did know that some of the best military and civilian talent that America and its allies could muster were put in charge. It really was leadership that made it all come together, fit, and run at a tempo that was virtually unbeatable. As it turned out, some of the most intense courage was called for during the early days, right after Saddam invaded Kuwait. Much of this forever will be credited to President Bush and Margaret Thatcher, who almost single handily, shaped the course and stood by their decisions. Would Bush have done it alone, most likely not, but that is food for a different story.

As the months and years roll on, we have to remember that by our own choice we merely won the "battle", the victor of the "war" is yet to be determined. From the beginning, this was pointed out as being one of the real problems, but victory was in no way envisioned to have been as obtainable as it was. Saddam now simply has come to the conclusion that if you don't loose, you can still win.

As we look to the future, where conflict intensity has been overshadowed by technology and sophistication, we have to ask ourselves, how much can we really disarm when even small rebel bands can navigate with GPS, communicate via cellular telephone and bricks, exploit the night with NVG's, and defend themselves with SA-14/16's or Stingers. All this while eating molded rice and being bare-footed. Then sure enough, the Balkan situation came. We have been fighting for peace there for the last ten years. And we are still fighting over northern and southern Iraq. Since 1990 no serious conflict has come to closure and in fact we are being tasked to deal with more and more each day and the lessons learned advantage is slipping to the bad guys as they accommodate for out technology advantage little by little.

"Throughout History, military victories have been followed, first by relief, then by disappointment.

The people of America and Britain and all the other countries that contributed to the victory in the Gulf

should not allow their inevitable disappointments to cloud their final judgment about the War. It is not a

War that ended all Wars.... It was however, a necessary war, which righted an obvious wrong and

stopped a bloodthirsty tyrant in his tracks. That is reason enough for pride"

- by Peter David, the International Editor of the Economist Magazine,

writing in Random House's Commemorative on the Persian Gulf War,

"Triumph in the Desert"

And then we have to remember the master’s words…….

"War is an Act of Force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that Force"

... Karl von Clausewitz

During September 1990, then USAF Chief of Staff General Michael J. Dugan, talked openly about Air Power and how it could provide an overwhelming punch against Iraq to such an extent that it would break the will and means of the Iraqi forces before any ground operations would be needed. His candor, and to some degree his confidence, caused his removal from office by Secretary Cheney and General Powell who labeled him a "non-team player" in the game of Air-Land Battle. In retrospect everything that General Dugan said, or meant to say, proved right. And now we all owe him a "tip of our glasses" for holding true to his beliefs, and remaining true to his school. Considering the General as a warrior, a leader, an example, a decent man, and a believer in all the things that we have worked for since the fall of Saigon, these proceedings are gratefully presented to celebrate his vision. Many air power skeptics in January 1991 must have felt, just as those who watched the Enola Gay lift off, that it was just too good to be true. None of them had the foresight to realize that the thinking of Mitchell, Douhet, and their disciples was always sound. It simply was waiting for the right mixture of doctrine, technology, and will-power to come along and prove it. Stand to your Glasses.....

Some of General Dugan's Points:

1. Air Power was the only option to avoiding a large and potentially bloody ground war. "Our nation has pursued for decades a policy that has substituted machines and technology for human lives. And I think, especially in this environment, we will continue to pursue that policy."

2. "Now there are those who say the final act has to be an infantryman walking in with an M-16 in his hand and that is how you assure whatever it is here is liberated. Indeed, that may be what the endgame is. But in my view the battlefield will have been well prepared before that last guy really has to walk in. And he will walk in, not have to to fight house by house."

This chronology is being organized to be posted on the Fighter Tactics Webb Page to serve as a living document. There are so many small points of data in this document that it will take many of the most serious historians to verify and update them. The reason is because in the end it will help everyone and especially the many new pilots who can take the time to review the events day by day, and in many cases hour by hour. The chronology documents every aircraft loss that was reported during the period from the invasion of Kuwait to well into the peace keeping operations of the mid to late 1990’s. The air-to-air kills are still be discussed and the unfortunate loss of LCdr Micheal Scott "Spike" Speicher is still being reviewed. It was our first real information saturated war and the first anomaly was that Baghdad’s local time was nearly half a world away from Washington time and so if you were not dealing with Zulu, there could be date problems on your data. This document tries to identify time in both zones or specifies that it is local time to the point of dicussion. You will see in the comments that in most instances the information was written just as it was first reported or heard. During the war the data was being monitored 24 hours a day and CNN was watched along with its backchannel dumps. The first press reports were usually the most important especially if they were changed later. The debates on the data are recorded as experienced. Have fun….. ET

Chronology of Developments:

This is an unofficial chronology and review of the crisis in the Persian/Arabian Gulf brought on by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was compiled from the hourly/daily/weekly news journals and the commercially available data bases, daily news letters, personal visits, and conversations with various people who have visited the region or who have some expertise on the issues. Remember, CNN really strated something. Today the internet has gone light years beyond what we had in 1990. In another decade we can only imagine.

The ten "boxes" of written materials has now grown to the point where they are being stored or thrown out. "Unfortunately", since the Pentagon's Final Report has been released, so many new controversies have been uncovered that it appears as if there will be no end in sight to the new material being made available for yet another look at the combat/systems effectiveness of the participants. As an example the December 1992 Air Force Magazine had an excellent article on the British Tornado units that filled made voids in the 1991/1992 data.

In the EURO/NATO fighter training world, the Gulf War started just as we were undertaking FWIT-90, and a very substantive Swedish Air Defense Symposium. After it ended we had DWIC-91, FWIT-92, TAM-92, and a Tiger Meet at Twenthe. DWIC-93 also came and went bringing the Russian Knights to Leeuwarden from Kublinca. After that we had FWIT-94 and a Tiger Meet at Kleine Brogel. Each exercise seemed to have included a larger participation and continued to focus on warfighting from the level of the pilots. With the landings into Somolia and the preparations to move into the Balkans during 1993, it still looked as if air power was going to have an important job to do.

Jane's Defense Weekly, Armed Forces Journal, Air International, Air Forces Monthly, The World Air Power Journal, the Hook, the New York Times, the San Diego Union, and the Independent (London) represented some of the best literary sources throughout 1991. After the War, AW&ST started to produce some of the best insights and debriefs particularly on the technology that was used. The Air Force Times also became surprisingly a good post-War source of information since it focused on the combat action from the individual airman's and pilot's viewpoint. With each returning unit there were stories of incidents and events that helped tie the sequence of events together, especially the air combat kills and losses. Towards the end of the summer 1991, Air Force Times began to run articles on the many awards and citations for heroism awarded to aircrews. The write-ups for those awards became an important gap filler on information covering the many sorties flown.

Anthony Cordesman, SASC Staffer for Senator McCain, produced several large volumes of notes and reprints of briefing slides from the many Pentagon visits to the Hill. Key points from his notes was integrated into this document whenever possible. Like it or not, Tony seems to me to have produced one of the most balanced looks at the material presented by the Pentagon. Likewise, Freedman's Book "Desert Victory", rushed into press, has a significant amount of amplifying data that was incorporated. "Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War", published by US News and World Report (Random House) reviews more than 600 interviews with Desert Storm veterans and has been praised as being one of the best post-war sources.

Of course, we also must recognize some of the many video's that have come out after the initial summary volumes produced by CNN. The Aviation Week video is well worth getting particularly since it presents some of the F-15 "kill" HUD footage, even though edited.

The 1991/1992 monthly KoKu Fans's and Airview , from Japan, have had very interesting pictorials on units in the Gulf and returning home. Throughout the months of the war they represented the best source "quality" color photography. My opinion, however, on the best overall source of all "Ground Forces" information was Jim Loop, formally from McAir and GD, and a retired Army O-6. As you might know, his collections, writings, analysis, and knowledge will not easily be replaced amongst aerospace and Intel researchers. For this work though, he has been very generous in both pointing me to published materials and commenting when I went way off the board with my limited understanding of "ground" things. Jim unfortunately was a victim of the A-12 shutdown, which is really our tragedy, but he has continued to consult and produce quality analysis. He also bravely fought a battle with an aggressive form of cancer, surviving more than five years after several months was his diagnosis. It was painful and sometimes horrible but he, in a most heroic way, brought cancer to its knees until his strength gave out. He gave himself to his Maker knowing that for his entire life he gave the good fight, always a lesson to the rest of us. Think of him when you can.

The best overall "on-line" sources have been the US Naval Institute Service and Newsnet's with "For Your Eyes Only", out of Amarillo, and enough can't be said about them. Perhaps they became the two most relied upon documents during the war weeks. I have noticed over the months that more and more people now get it. On a recent visit to the Gulf area it was well known and deeply relied upon.

In mid May 1992, I received my own copy of the Pentagon's "The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report April 1992". Immediately dug through it and was just as disappointed in it as everyone else seemed to be, both in and out of the military and government. But it was organized well and filled in many gaps on the organizational structures and participants. The general "performance" data of weapon systems and units was already old, but there have been new releases of information occurring every day. But let's not kid ourselves, it is about the best we could have expected and as an overall publication it will pass the test of time.

Then, Richard P. Hallion publishes "Storm Over Iraq: Air Power and the Gulf War", maybe the best overall review on air power and the Gulf War yet. Many things started to fall into place and in Dick’s own magical way he brings the use and abuse of air power right into the open. The book represents to me the best source on the Gulf War or at the least an essential start point for any serious scholar or author. Only Dr Hallion has the depth in air power history to put the Gulf War into perspective with all other air wars. Over time it simply becomes more important.

Almost at the same time, Elliot Cohen, Director of the Air Force's "Gulf War Air Power Study 1991-1993", which was released in May 1993, and a new Rand post Cold War Study entitled "The New Calculus: Analyzing Airpower's Changing Role in Joint Theater Campaigns", provided strong inputs to General McPeak's "Bottom-Up Review" of the USAF's missions and roles. All three works have included just about everything that is important about the Gulf War and they do an admirable job in their analysis. In my opinion, military historians can now properly asses the War. There is also Rick Atkinson's "Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War", Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1993, who opens his work with "Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won", from Arthus Wellesley's "Duke of Wellington 1815".

Before the Gulf War started, the original text for this document was produced, in haste to help provide background information for those going over. Many things were wrong, many overstated, and it generally held to viewpoints directed at the squadron unit levels. Now in the constant reworking of the text, and as the facts come in, the field of view, sort of speaking, has gotten elevated and broader.

There were many "Chronologies" and "Booklets" reviewing issues that came up during the War, but initially, the best I saw was done by the Military Review Magazine in its Sept 1991 summary issue on "The Gulf War". It impressed me enough that I decided that a day to day review might be the best way to record the Gulf War and as a data base it would make a ready made filing system. Throughout the conflict the MRM has brought some of the best insight and analysis. I have tried to integrate many of their pertinent points into the Chronology below. As others become available they also were picked apart and pieces added. The bibliography presented in the MRM special edition is worth looking at since it reflects some of the best writings on the Gulf.

Several additional well done booklets have been produced that add greatly to the data base and particular mention must be made of the incredible compilation of data on the aircraft and pilots of the 37th TFW (F-117's) done by SMSgt Harold P. Myers for the Wing's Office of History (USAF Ret). Myers covered the operations of the F-117 on a day by day basis, wave by wave. It was a great job, but the target listings are often in-complete or differ from other released representations of F-117 missions. Some targets that were celebrated in the Press or by the military did not cross-check with Myers' listings, but there can be many reasons for that. In general it must be assumed that his listing provides in the most general terms the target "sets" that were attacked for each "wave" or Stealth Fighter "cycle".

· Nighthawks Over Iraq: A Chronology of the F-117A Stealth Fighter in Operations

Desert SHIELD and STORM, Special Study 37FW/HO-91-1, by Harold P. Myers, Office of History, Headquarters 37th FW. 12th Air Force, ACC, 09Jan92

*Desert Storm Air War, by Lou Drendal, Squadron Signals Pub, 1991

* Aircraft Illustrated, June 1991

* Air Combat, June 1991

* Air War Over the Gulf, by Eric Micheletti, Europa Press

* The United States Navy in Desert SHIELD/STORM, Navy Dept, CNO, 15May91

* The Gulf Air War Debrief, from the World Air Power Journal, 1991

* A Strike by Stealth, by James P. Coyne, Air Force Magazine, March 1992

* Conduct of the Persion Gulf War, Pentagon Summary Report 1993

Now just when I thought I could put this document finally to bed, John Deur (Intercept Publications out of Cleveland, Ohio), decided to prepare a fantastic piece of work that will be called "Wall of Eagles: Aerial Engagements and Victories in Operation Desert Storm". It is a complete one-on-one debriefing of each of the MiG killers from the coalition forces, most of which were USAF F-15 pilots. It takes off where the "The Gulf Air War Debrief" leaves off. I suspect it will go down as the best work available that gives the personal accounts of the pilots. Anyway, you're right, it has been included in this text wherever it could correct or update facts.

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