THE FINNISH FIGHTER TACTICS AND TRAINING BEFORE AND DURING THE WW II By Heikki Nikunen Fighter History Tactics Development Flight Training System The Winter War The Temporary Peace Conclusions Sources   THE CONTINUATION WAR 25 June 1941 - 4 September 1944 Tactics When the Continuation War started the Finnish fighter force was in a remarkably better shape than in the beginning of the Winter War. Four fighter squadrons had rather good fighter aircraft in their disposal; Brewsters (BW), Fiats (FA), Moranes (MS) and Curtisses (CU). The Brewster fighter However, all the other types except the Brewsters were already gradually becoming obsolete in their performance and weaponry. The basic personnel in the squadrons consisted of the war hardened veterans and also the reserve pilots had got a short but intensive rehearsal training. The new fighters had been test flown and the special type oriented tactics had been developed for them. Examples: " In April 1941 a serie of test flights was started. There was FA-22 with ski-undercarriage and armour protection and FA-15 with wheel-undercarriage and without armour. Aaltonen test flew the FA-22 and Suikkanen the FA-15. The tests included climb to 15 000 feet, turns at various speeds, stall, aerobatics, dive speeds, extra height in immelman etc. The attained dive speeds were 750 - 800 kilometers per hour." (16) "The squadron`s new fighters make the daily service very interesting. We test the new fighter`s performance in all the phases of the air combat. We study the Wright Cyclone engine, 12.7 mm guns, hydraulic systems, radio etc. We test the shooting accuracy of the Brewster and find it excellent! The sharpest shooters have one hundred hits on the target from one hundred bullets.   Brewster being loaded   Reserve pilots begin to report to our squadron and we give them a short but intensive training with section, division and flight formations, air combat, air gunnery, aerobatics and radio exercises." (14) The basics of the Winter War fighter tactics remained the same in the Continuation War. The shortage of the fighters in the Winter War had, however, often limited the tactical freedom to the use of the sections. Now it was possible to use bigger formations to increase the strike power and mutual support (11): " In the combat spread formation the lead division flew lower, and on the side of it and higher flew the top cover division. Both of those divisions were made of two independent sections. When the combat started the lead division hit first, and only if the help was needed, the top division joined the battle. Even in that case the other section of the top division stayed up, if possible, to give cover. In the big air combats the fight spread out after the first attack over a large area and there was no way to maintain formation integrity. Individual sections of two fighters each tried to stay together to lend mutual support within the section or division." In the offensive phase of the Continuation War the fighter units got experiences which modified somewhat the tactical principles. Both the own and the enemy fighters had changed, the force ratio was not so unfavorable and the offensive gave new missions for the fighters (17). The main mission for the fighters still was the air superiority battle, but additional missions were ground attacks, reconnaissance flights and even artillery fire control flights. One of the most important phases of the air combat was the search. It had to be done so that the own formation was hiding itself as well as possible and at the same time all own pilots could keep an effective look out. The principles of the search were as follows (17): The Fokkers (FR) were operating mainly over the sea where the enemy used rather small formations. FRs used usually divisions or a division plus section with one section as the top cover. The enemy flew normally at low altitudes, so, FRs also used altitudes of 600 - 1 500 feet. Fokkers were rather slow and therefore used shorter distances between the section`s planes than the other types, normally about 75 yards. The Fiats (FA) flew usually in a division formation so that the section separation was 100 - 150 yards and the distance between the sections was 300 - 400 yards. If two divisions were flying together the distance between them was 1000 - 2000 yards. FAs used normally the altitudes of 6 000 - 10 000 feet to be able to convert potential energy for speed; the enemy flew usually at 1 500 - 4 500 feet. It was a standard practice to make small turns during the search and the wingmen changed often wing to improve the look out. The Curtisses (CU) used the normal combat spread formation and the top cover section changed the side freely. The Brewsters (BW) flew the search phases using a flight formation. Both of the divisions could check the six of another and the top division flew clearly higher. BWs had a good radio system and the fighter power could be quickly concentrated from a large area. The Moranes (MS) used usually a division formation and had almost always to fight against bigger numbers. The speed of the fighter had its effect on the spread of the formation; the faster the speed, the broader the formation. The best way for the look out was that every pilot performed his look out as if he had been alone in the sky. The use of the top cover proved to be important to avoid the surprises. The flying in division formations demanded a good skill level in the search and individual combat because the two sections had to be able to fight against even the big superiority in numbers until additional forces arrived. The benefit of the small formations was that they were harder to see. The enemy radio intelligence was well arranged and therefore there was a radio silence until the enemy was seen. The most combats were fighter combats and the Finnish formations always took the initiative In the air combats the following characteristics were found (17): The most combats were fighter combats and the Finnish formations always took the initiative. In all cases the flight of about ten fighters was strong enough to fight successfully even against the big enemy formations until additional fighters were sent to the battle. The Brewsters used against the Soviet I-153 and I-16 aircraft the energy tactics in which they hit from above and pulled again up to a new attack position. The enemies tried with their agile fighters to get into a nose to nose shooting positions but lost often the systematic defence capability. The winner was usually not determined by the performance of the fighter but by the skill of the pilot. The Soviet pilots seemed often to be good flyers but bad shooters and also not capable to fight alone. They still often used their old tight formations of three aircraft. It seemed that they had at least partially abandoned their old training system but were not yet ready for the new one, and in any case had not given training for that. The attacks on the escorted bomber formations had been successful. The first attackers hit the escort fighters and shot them down or forced them to break, and then the other fighters could concentrate on the bombers. The slow Fokkers tried to avoid fighter combats concentrating on the enemy seaplanes and reconnaissance aircraft. The attacks were usually done from the rear sector and the enemies tried to escape at the low level to eliminate the shooting position from behind and below. The Fiats also used the energy tactics in the fighter combats. The Curtisses lacked speed but they were agile and used as an evasive maneuver a steep and tight climb turn which often caused the enemy to stall. The experiences in the interception mission were as follows (17): The interception by alarms demanded a good air surveillance and communication network. The optimum system consisted of central radio stations, about 30 miles apart, each surrounded by six short wave radio stations about 6 - 13 miles apart. The traffic between fighters and ground stations was done either on the plain language or using secret words. The locations were given as the names of the places or with the grid map method. If the air surveillance network was good the interception sorties were very effective in the zone which covered about 30 miles from the front or coast. The continuous readiness could be maintained by lodging the personnel in the tents beside the fighters. After the peak of the offensive it was enough to keep only a part of a squadron in the continuous readiness. If the radio intelligence had advance information about the enemy air operations, the pilots were sitting in the cockpits with the engines running. The normal readiness was that the pilots were beside the fighters and the engines were kept warm. The combat air patrol was used during important transportations, attacks and river crossings. The ground controller with a radio was positioned in the protected troops. If the protected target was in a small area, rather low altitudes had to be used to avoid the enemy surprise attacks. The experiences in the escort missions were as follows (17): The escort mission caused the fighters to wait for the initiative of the enemy fighters, so, to compensate the unfavourable initial situation the number of the escort fighters had to be rather big. The escort mission was rather difficult when the speed of the protégé was low; the fighters had to make wide turns which were more easily seen by the enemy and during which it was hard to keep the protégé in sight. In the ground attacks the strikes on the marching troops, truck and horse columns and trains were found effective. The enemy anti aircraft fire was quite fierce and that's why the surprise was essential. The Fokkers attacked successfully on the sea targets using armour penetrating ignition bullets. Torpedo boats and even bigger ships could be set on fire with those. The attacks were done simultaneously from different directions and the boats` evasive maneuvers could be anticipated and followed. The reconnaissance flights by the fighters proved to be effective. However, the pilot had to be able to keep in his mind the reconnaissance results without notes. The best way was to give the reconnaissance information in the real time by radio to the responsible staff. This was specially important during the offensive during which the situations changed quickly. When the fighters carried out a reconnaissance mission, one pilot concentrated on the reconnaissance task and the others kept the look out for the enemy fighters (17). The fighter bases were located at 30 - 60 miles from the front line, but temporary air bases were also positioned rather near the front line. Especially the Fiats, due to their short range, had to use a forward basing system. The forward bases had to have a good anti aircraft system and the flight units had to be kept in the high readiness. The temporary transfers of the fighter units had to be made to concentrate the fighter power to the critical battle areas. Those transfers, however, always demanded rather extensive advance preparations (17). The enemy tried to avoid the air combats which almost without exception were victorious for the Finns. So, the FAF had the air superiority during the offensive phase of the Continuation War. The enemy tried to avoid the air combats which almost without exception were victorious for the Finns. So, the FAF had the air superiority during the offensive phase of the Continuation War. The Soviet pilots opened the fire at too long ranges. They used as the combat maneuvers slow rolls, loops, immelmans and some uncontrolled movements which they did well but which didn`t have much practical use in the air combat. The most frequent enemy fighter of that time was the I-153 which was as fast as CU but slower than BW, MS and FA. It was extremely agile and could benefit the reverse firing opportunities, however, usually losing these "wild west sheriff duels". The I-16 bis had become more general than the I-16 and it was a very good fighter; from the Finnish fighters only BW was better than it. The new enemy fighter types, MiG-1 and MiG-3, were fast but obviously they were sensitive to stall and spin; they always tried to get a surprise and avoided dog fight (18). The cooperation in the Soviet formations was improving but still sometimes was inadequate; the top cover could escape from the battle and sometimes even the other section of a division disappeared when the another section was under an attack (19). In the Eastern Karelia the enemy used in the same formation several different aircraft types and it was a kind of indication that even a superpower could suffer the shortage of the aircraft. The Soviet fighters flew usually below 7 500 feet and they often used clouds not only to escape but also to hit back (20). In the end of 1941 the enemy started to use new flying units with British and American fighters. These were transported to Archangel and assembled in Vologda. The Hawker Hurricane squadrons operated in Sorokka area and the Curtiss Tomahawk squadrons in Leningrad area. The type transfer training obviously had been short because in the first combats against Hurricanes these were found as easy targets (21). The Soviet MiG-3 fighters avoided dog fights against MS and FR fighters and they had started to apply the energy tactics. They also opened fire nearer than before (21). When the trench war period started in the spring of 1942, the enemy began to intensify its flight operations over the Gulf of Finland. The targets of the operations were the sea traffic, the harbour city Kotka and Suursaari Island. The enemy also flew continuous reconnaissance flights to check the sea traffic, the railway and road transportations in the Southern Finland and the front line. More and more MiG-3 and Tomahawk fighters were in use and a new ground attack aircraft, the Il-2, made its first appearance. In the summer and autumn of 1942 appeared LaGG-3 and Spitfire fighters. BW fighters could still fight successfully against these new models. In fighter combats the BWs used broad and loose flight formations with a big altitude separation (22). In the spring of 1943 again new types, La-5, Yak-1, Yak-7b and Boston III appeared over the Gulf of Finland. The new Soviet fighters had better performance than the Brewsters (BW), but at that time the FAF got new Messerschmitt 109 G 2 (MT) fighters which were good enough in performance and very successful in their energy tactics. The BWs had to use bigger formations with a very wide altitude separation and often the MT fighters flew top cover for them. In addition to that the ground control station network on the coast proved to be very effective for the fighter operations (22). Also north of Lake Ladoga, in the Aunus area, the enemy flight operations intensified in the summer of 1942. The Curtiss (CU) squadron which operated there, had a rather small amount of fighters and flew both the intercept sorties and escort missions by sections and divisions. The advantage of the small formations was that the CUs often were able to make the surprise attacks. They proved to be successful against even the much bigger numbers of the enemy fighters. The CUs, Curtiss Hawk 75 As, were slower than any enemy type in that area, and therefore they always tried to start the fight from the height advantage. This was the only way to catch, for example, the new and fast enemy bomber Pe-2. In the dog fights the CU pilots proved to be superior compared to the opponents and therefore they always tried to tie the enemy in those. The principle was always to attack regardless of the numbers. During summer 1942 the CU squadron didn`t lose a single pilot although in one air combat, for example, one CU pilot had to fight alone against 5 LaGG-3s until these retreated to their own side, while the CU pilot chased them and shot one of them down (23). In the Maaselkä area north of Aunus the enemy air activity was very low after the trench war started. The BWs were transferred to the Gulf of Finland front and the MS fighters remained in Maaselkä. MSs proved to be inferior compared to the enemy fighters, but the skill of the pilots kept the win ratio victorious. The MS fighters got more and more reconnaissance missions over the vast forest area of the Eastern Karelia (24). The enemy still avoided air combats. Spitfire and Hurricane pilots were more aggressive knowing the good performance of their fighters. The other pilots usually tried to escape using extremely low altitude to eliminate the shooting position from behind and below. The I-16 fighters also used rockets as air-to-air weapons. During escort missions the enemy fighters sometimes disappeared letting their protégés on the mercy of the Finnish fighters. In the Aunus area the most common enemy fighters were the MiG-3s. Those were ready to challenge the Finnish CU fighters only if they had a big numerical superiority and they were on their own side of the front line. They used mostly the energy tactics and often flew in the line astern formation patrolling over their own troop positions. In the Maaselkä area the enemy used more and more Tomahawk and Hurricane fighters. The skill level of the enemy pilots had increased, but they still lacked accuracy in the air gunnery (25). In the beginning of 1943 one prisoner of war pilot told that the Soviets tried actively to learn the opponent`s fighter tactics and develop their methods and training according to that (26). In the beginning of 1943 one prisoner of war pilot told that the Soviets tried actively to learn the opponent`s fighter tactics and develop their methods and training according to that The emphasis of the enemy air operations concentrated more and more on the Gulf of Finland where quite big formations were used. (27) The enemy used over the Gulf of Finland new aircraft types like LaGG-3s, La-5s, Yak-1s, Il-2s and Pe-2s. The Soviets improved their attack planning and cooperation in the formations. The bombers and ground attack aircraft flew at the lowest altitude escorted by the fast fighters LaGG-3s and La-5s. The top cover fighters flew high ahead and behind the attack formation. During the return flight the old I-153 and I-16 fighters could take off from Lavansaari island base to protect the Il-2 attack planes. These I-fighters acted as kind of baits for the Finnish fighters; they were agile and if the Finnish fighters started the fight with them they lost time and the attack planes could slip away. In the air combats the enemy pilots tried to draw the battle into the circle of their island base and ship anti aircraft artillery (28). During the late summer of 1943 the old enemy fighters disappeared from the Gulf of Finland and they were replaced by the LaGG-3s and La-5s. The combat experiences showed that BW was more agile than the LaGG-3. The La-5 had superior performance compared to BW. The LaGG-3 was about as agile as MT. The La-5 was more agile than MT being in the same category with MT in the other performance (29). Over the Gulf of Finland and Karelian Isthmus the enemy often used a formation of four Il-2s escorted by four fighters. From two to three of these kind of formations flew in line astern with 5 minutes time intervals. The biggest enemy formations included about 45 aircraft. In the big formations the bombers and ground attack planes flew at low level and the escort fighters were stacked above them up to 15 000 feet. The enemy ground control system seemed to work well. The enemy fighters often were positioned so that the Finnish fighters attacked them and the Soviet bombers could slip to their island bases at Seiskari and Lavansaari (30). In the beginning of 1944 the enemy increased the combat air patrol type of operations over the Gulf of Finland. The skill of the enemy pilots proved to be mixed due to their pilot losses during the battle of the Gulf of Finland. The accuracy in the air gunnery still was not very good and obviously the best pilots had been transferred to La-5 and Yak-9 fighters. The LaGG-3 pilots looked newcomers; for example one LaGG-3 formation had started a dog fight with the Finnish MS fighters and all the LaGGs had been shot down (31). In the beginning of the summer 1944 the Finnish fighter control and base system was reorganized in the Karelian Isthmus and on the coast of the Gulf of Finland due to the increased air operations of the enemy. The Finnish fighter leaders expected the Soviet strategic attack to begin in the early summer 1944 and arranged the fighter system ready for that. In the end of May 1944 a new wing control center began to control the entire fighter force flexibly in the area of the expected main defence sector (22). When the Soviet attack started on 9th June 1944 the enemy concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus about 1500 aircraft. Their mission was to bomb the Finnish front line troops and transportations, to reconnoiter the defence positions and to maintain the air superiority. The main idea was to break the defensive line with a heavy bombardment. The Soviet air task lacked the strategic elements and being more tactical directed the Soviet air resources to a very small operation area. This made the Finnish fighter units` task much easier because now the limited fighter force could be concentrated effectively on that same small area. Only the MT fighters had good enough performance to fight successfully against the manyfold superior numbers of the attacker. Other fighter types were transferred to secure the rear and side sectors. Messerschimitt Bf-109 in Finnish colours The intercept sorties were flown with as many fighters as was available at any certain moment, usually 8 - 20 fighters. The basic idea was that the top section or division attacked on the Soviet escort fighters while the lower division or flight attacked on the bombers. However, often, due to the great numbers of the Soviet escort fighters, all of the Finnish fighters had to commit themselves to the fighter combats. Anyhow, the Finnish principle was always to attack even as a section regardless of the numbers of the enemy. The limited fighter force was not able to repulse the bomb raids, but it caused continuous losses which were eating the enemy pilot cadre. The attacks scattered the Soviet formations and spread the combat over a larger area where the enemy could not get the direct benefit from the big numbers. The duels were solved by the combat skill and shooting accuracy of the individual pilots and the Finns proved to be the winners almost always. There were several occasions in which the Soviet formation turned back after seeing the Finnish fighters in the interception position (22). When the Soviet offensive was stopped in the middle of July 1944 the enemy activity also in the air operations began to go down. The Soviet fighters started to avoid air combats while the Finnish fighter force was continuously becoming stronger due to the small losses and the deliveries of the additional MT fighters (22). One very important mission for the Finnish fighters was to escort own bomber formations. These played a decisive role in the defence because the bombings could be concentrated on attacking massed troops just before preplanned attack times. Warnings of impending troop movements were continually being captured by radio intelligence. The bomber formations included usually 30 - 40 aircraft and they were escorted by 12 - 18 fighters divided in three groups. The first group escorted the lower bombers, mainly Blenheims, the second group escorted the higher bombers, mainly Junkers Ju 88s and the third group flew as a top cover. The fighters escorted the bombers also during the return flight to 30 - 60 miles over own side, and then returned over the front line to patrol. The MT fighters were extremely effective in their escort missions; the escorted Finnish formations didn`t loose a single bomber for the enemy fighters (22). In August 1944 the enemy air operations came practically to a halt; the Finnish fighter units continued to patrol and make reconnaissance sorties to secure the situation (22).   Training Air Academy (5) The training was started in the Air Academy where the students got the general military training, the Air Force special training and the elementary flight training. They were then transferred to 35 Training Squadron in Vesivehmaa Air Base where they got the type transfer training to the fighters and the air combat training. The elementary flight training program consisted of about 140 flight hours including about 30 hours combat training in an advanced trainer Pyry and old fighters Bulldog, Gauntlet, Gamecock and Fokker D XXI, and also shooting at ground targets and air gunnery. Altogether 351 pilots got the elementary training during the Continuation War. The flight training program in the training squadron consisted of about 70 flight hours divided into: air combat training 50 hours instrument flight training 4 hours fighter type transfer training 8.5 hours air gunnery 9.5 hours Very successful were the visits of the fighter aces who lectured to the students about the fighter tactics and enemy aircraft and methods. Like in the Winter War also during the Continuation War the pilot losses were quite small and therefore the front line squadrons didn`t need much new pilots. Also again, the number of the training aircraft was small compared to the students and so the training times extended. This was not harmful operationally, but was frustrating for the students who impatiently waited for a chance to start their careers as the front line fighter pilots.   Squadrons (24) The training in the fighter squadrons was divided into the practical and the theoretical training. The practical training included type transfer training for the new pilots and rehearsal flights, air combat exercises and air gunnery for the older pilots. The type transfer training included the introduction to the systems of the fighter, and a 5 flight hours` program with air combat maneuvers, aerobatics, attack exercises on air targets and air gunnery. After that the new pilot could be taken into the operations at first to familiarize himself to the operation sector and then to be a member of a battle formation among the experienced pilots. In theoretical training the new pilots got information about readiness details, the use of the grid map, radio traffic and the control center system. There were lessons and discussions about fighter tactics, and in the flights the tactical details were pondered. Some flight commanders used the return flights as search and attack exercises. Also, experienced aces were used as trainers for the new pilots in the dog fight exercises. Go to Conclusions Go back to Fighter History page

Home Latest Topic | Air Warfare | Conferences/AirShows | Fighter Tactics | Fighter Aircraft | Missiles | Fighter Aviation Topic | Fighter History | Warbirds | Magazines | Current News | Links | Physiology | Photo Gallery | Bibliography | SIIVET - Wings | What's New J Lindberg. Copyright © 1997-2006 Fighter Tactics Academy. All rights reserved. Revised: tammikuu 01, 2006.