G.E. Magnusson - the father of Finnish fighter tactics, Page 5   Centralized fighter command After Marshall Mannerheim's visit to Suulajärvi CINCFAF Gen Lundqvist came to the base on the 29th of May. Mannerheim had given Magnusson the command of Lentorykmentti 3, LeR.3. Magnusson took command of the whole fighter regiment the next day. This left the position of LeLv 24 commander open. Magnusson selected Jorma Karhunen to succeed him as the new squadron commander. Hasse Wind became the commander of the 3rd Flight after Karhunen. After taking command of the regiment Magnusson did what he had promised in his speech - he restricted the Brewsters to be used only against bomber offensives at the Karelian Isthmus and to the northern shores of the Gulf of Finland. On the 30th of May 1943 commander LeLv 24, Lt Col G.E. Magnusson was given the command of Fighter Regiment 3 (LeR.3). Immediately after redefining the Brewster missions Magnusson arranged a radio intelligence post to be set at Suulajärvi. After this he reinforced the Brewster operations at the Karelian Isthmus by sending six Messerschmitts to help the Brewsters. Lauri Pekuri was now fighting again with the Brewsters this time leading his Messerschmitt flight. Co-operation proved difficult at times since the American radios in the Brewsters weren't compatible with the German radios in the Messerschmitts. Fighter controllers learned to cope with this and now relayed intercepted Russian radio traffic to the Brewsters and Messerschmitts in order to get them into proper attack positions. Magnusson set to develop a centralized and flexible fighter control system also to the Karelian Isthmus area. He focused in getting that system ready since he anticipated that the war would still go on for a long time. When there was no help from the Finnish Air Force HQ, Magnusson asked the commander of the IV Army Corps to assist in the construction of the system. New fighter control posts were built at Suulajärvi, Suur-Merijoki and Lappeenranta. Magnusson checked personally over one hundred air surveillance posts. Signals corps built direct phone lines to the fighter control posts and from them to fighter bases. A SIGINT (signals intelligence) unit was added to LeR.3 control post. Now the centralized system allowed the fighter units to be concentrated to the most important areas for optimum interception. Magnusson used all his determination into getting the new air surveillance and fighter control system ready during winter 1943 - 44. By early June 1944 the system was complete - on the 9th of June 1944 the Soviet Union commenced a large scale offensive against Finland. Magnusson had requested Messerschmitts for his old squadron LeLv 24 several times to replace the outdated Brewsters. Finally, on 4 April 1944 the squadron received the first four Bf 109G-2s to the 1st Flight. 2nd Flight got the Messerschmitts on 11 April and the 3rd at the end of the month. Now both LeLv 34 and LeLv 24 were flying Messerschmitts. (Finland bought a total of 159 Messerschmitt Bf 109G2 - G10s from Germany) The Russian June 1944 offensive was supported with formations of over 100 aircraft. Daily enemy flights totaled over 1000. LeLv 24 and LeLv 34 were supporting the Finnish defence over the Karelian Isthmus. Eka Magnusson pulled the LeR.3 fighters back to new bases when the Red Army advanced. Magnusson had planned the reorganization of the fighter forces in anticipation of a large scale Soviet attack. He wrote two official letters to the Finnish Air Force HQ suggesting the preparations for a new organization in the possible event of an offensive in the near future. As late as May 1944 the Finnish Air Force HQ didn't see any need for reorganization and didn't see any threat of an imminent offensive. Luckily Magnusson had started preparations "behind the backs" of the FAF HQ officers and for this reason LeR.3 was ready when the Soviet offensive commenced on the 9th of June. In early June 1944 Magnusson's command post took command of all Finnish flight operations over the Karelian Isthmus. LeLv 24 had already been pulled back further away from the front before the Soviet attack. LeR.3 command post had alternative locations all the way Kausala in the west. Lappeenranta turned out to be the westernmost location that was used during the war. All these preparations enabled Magnusson to use the mobility of his LeR.3 Messerschmitt force by "jumping" from base to base while still retaining the capability to concentrate the whole fighter force whenever needed to the most critical point of the enemy air offensive. LeLv 24 was given armed recce missions and interception missions over southern Karelian Isthmus and Gulf of Finland. Also Luukkanen's LeLv 34 was now connected to LeR.3 command post so Magnusson's longtime dream and plan had become reality. Later the squadrons were used together in mixed escort missions when the situation over the front got more desperate. The LeLv 24 and LeLv 34 fighter pilots were now called on duty some five to six times a day to fight the large bomber formations supported by enemy fighters. Finnish fighter pilots slept under the wings of their fighters or in the nearby alert shacks waiting for the phone to ring. Key to the success was fast takeoff and attack followed by disengagement from the fight. The four weeks following the 9 June offensive were a nightmare to the Finnish pilots fighting against superior numbers. Hasse Wind built his score from 44 victories to 74 in just two weeks: 14 June: 5 victories, all Pe-2s 15 June: 2 victories, 1 Airacobra, 1 Il-2 16 June: 3 victories, 2 Pe-2, 1 La-5 19 June: 3 victories, 2 Airacobra, 1 La-5 20 June: 5 victories, 2 La-5, 2 Jak-9, 1 Pe-2 22 June: 3 victories, 2 Spitfire, 1 La-5 23 June: 4 victories, 2 La-5, 2 Db-3f 25 June: 5 victories, 3 Jak-9, 2 Jak-17 On the 28th of June 1944 Magnusson ordered Hasse Wind to an armed recce flight that turned out to be his last combat flight thus ending Wind's score at 75. When operations ceased on the 4th of September 1944 Magnusson's old LeLv 24 had scored 240 victories during the Soviet 1944 offensive. The total score for the Winter War and Continuation War was 877 with 32 own losses.   The legacy of Eka Magnusson Before World War II there were many contradicting trends in Finnish Air Force. Unfortunately some of Giulio Douhet's ideas prevailed in the small air force and recourses were divided between fighter and bomber forces. The war proved that the the small numbers of expensive bombers had no lasting effect in the forces of the huge enemy even how courageous bomber missions the Finnish crews flew deep in the Soviet Union. Concentrating in the defence of the home country with highly trained fighter forces turned out the be the right solution, but the numbers were just too small. Before the war Magnusson came up with several excellent ideas that proved out to be vital for the Finnish fighter defence in WWII: Sending young officers abroad to learn and compare fighter training in other countries Building coherent and progressive fighter training syllabi Careful selection of fighter pilots to the units Proper briefing and debriefing techniques Accurate student tracking and feedback system Right tactical formations for the weapon systems used Economic weapons training system Focusing fully in the most important weapon system Careful tracking of security policy issues and proper adjustment of the fighter training according to the situation Colonel Richard Lorentz (left) and Lieutenant Colonel Erik Magnusson belonged to the key persons in the development of the Finnish fighter tactics. The manual of fighter training and tactics was prepared under the guidelines given by Lorentz. Magnusson developed and effective surveillance and control system to position the small fighter force in the right place at the right time. He was obviously the only operational commander in the Finnish Defense Forces who was fully aware of the coming Soviet Strategic offensive in June and he also had Strong proponents of centralized air defence and fighter force; Col Richard Lorentz (left) and Lt Col G.E. Magnusson. his defense system ready for the occasion. The reason for this was simple; he believed in the information which his pilots, and the photo reconnaissance pilots, continuously brought home from their regular reconnaissance missions. This information was then passed on to the higher headquarters and Army staffs. Magnusson successfully applied his theories throughout the war: Optimizing attack profiles for fighter and weapon system performance Successful combination of carefully selected experienced and young fighter pilots in the units Right two-ship, four-ship and flight formation tactics Risk optimization; a combination of cautious fighter missions combined with bold surprise attacks with large fighter formations - no one-way ticket kamikaze missions planned A vision of the overall system: air surveillance, fighter control, communications, bases and tactics Dispersed flexible basing combined with centralized command Patience and persistence in forming the system even if the air force headquarters opposed it Believing his visions Col (ret) G.E. Magnusson in autumn 1989. The persistent fight to develop the fighter forces gave positive results from the first Winter War days of the Fokker squadron. Gustav Erik Magnusson was born on the 8th of December 1902 at Alatornio. He joined the Kuopio Suojeluskunta (Home Guard) on the eve of the 1918 War in Finland. During the war he was feeding cartridges to the machine gun of Sakari Simelius (later commander of the Finnish Defence Forces). After the war Magnusson wanted to join the air force since he had seen an aircraft on the ice of lake Kaukajärvi at Tampere. Cadet Sergeant Magnusson graduated from the Cadet School as a 2nd lieutenant (ensign) in 1925. He began the air force flight course two years later and made friends with Richard Lorentz and Armas Eskola. Magnusson was posted to a maritime squadron at Tervaniemi from 1925 to 1929 when he got a transfer to the Finnish Air Force HQ to serve under Maj Kustaa Sihvo. The pair came up with a fighter-oriented development program for the air force. Unfortunately this program was never approved. When artillery colonel Jarl Fr. Lundqvist became the commander of the Finnish Air Force in 1931 the air force got distracted to bombers. Magnusson and Lorentz were left alone as fighter aviation proponents. Both Lorentz and Magnusson served at Utti air base from 1932. This eased up the co-operation between these two visionaries. Magnusson decided to widen his horizons and applied for service in the French Air Force. He paid for the tour himself in 1933. Later he test flew the Fokker D.XXI in the Netherlands in 1937 and flew Messerschmitt Bf 109s already in 1938 in JG 132, the Richthofen Geschwader. Lorentz examined Magnusson's reports carefully and together they developed the Finnish fighter training during the 1930's. Magnusson took command of LeLv 24, Fighter Squadron 24 on the eve of WWII in 1938. He commanded the squadron until 30 May 1943 when he was made the commander of Fighter Regiment 3, LeR.3. By that time his squadron had scored over 500 victories in the war.  Magnusson was promoted to colonel in 1944. Two years later he resigned from the armed forces. In civilian life Magnusson worked in banking until 1970 when he retired. Magnusson was promoted to Major General in the reserves on 4 June 1993. He passed away on 27 Dec 1994. References: Juutilainen, Ilmari: Double Fighter Knight, Apali, Tampere 1996, ISBN 952-5026-04-03 Karhunen, Joppe: Magnussonin laivue (Magnusson's Squadron), Otava, Helsinki 1969 Karhunen, Joppe: Taistelulentäjän muistelmat (Memoirs of a fighter pilot), Tammi, Jyväskylä 1998, ISBN 951-31-1253-5 Keskinen, Kalevi: Brewster B-239, Litopaino Tampere 1970 Keskinen Kalevi, Stenman Kari, Niska Klaus: Fokker D.XXI, Forssan Kirjapaino Oy, Forssa 1974 Nykänen, Jukka: Fokker D.XXI Suomen sinessä (Fokker D.XXI in Finland's blue skies), Itäviestintä Oy, Kuopio 1989, ISBN 952-90-1518-6 Sjögren, Börje: Hasse Wind, hävittäjälentäjä (Hasse Wind, fighter pilot), Tammi, Helsinki 1984, ISBN 951-30-6070-5 Stenman Kari, Keskinen Kalevi: Finnish Aces of World War 2, Osprey Publishing, Oxford 1998, ISBN 1 85532 783 X Back to Finnish Fighter Aces Home Latest Topic | Air Warfare | Conferences/Air Shows | Fighter Tactics | Fighter Aircraft | Missiles | Fighter Aviation Topic | Fighter History | Warbirds | Magazines | Current News | Links | Physiology | Photo Gallery | Bibliography | SIIVET - Wings | What's New J Lindberg. 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